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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
Defendant/Appellant Marcia S. Merrill was a named
defendant in the original proceeding brought by Gunda and Laurence
Galloway on August 25, 1987.

She filed a Notice of Intent to

Redeem, from a sheriff's sale conducted on February 28, 1989, the
parcel of real property which is the subject of this appeal ("the
Galloway property").
Gloria Ruiz d/b/a CVF Land Investments was not a
party to the original action, but rather the purchaser of the
Galloway property at the February 28, 1989 sheriff's sale.

This

appeal concerns the amount due and payable to respondent CVF Land
Investment from defendant/appellant Merrill incident to redemption
of the Galloway property.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of this appeal before the Utah Court
of Appeals obtains pursuant to 78-2a-3(2) (j ), Utah Code Ann. (1953,
as amended), pursuant to order by the Utah Supreme Court dated
October 31, 1989 in Supreme Court proceeding No. 890409; also
pursuant to Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF THE APPEAL
Defendant/Appellant Marcia S. Merrill appeals from
the trial court's order of September 15, 1989, which increased by
some $13,405.20 the amount required to redeem from a sheriff's sale
1

conducted on February 28, a parcel of real property located in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah ("the Galloway property").

Respondent

Gloria Ruiz d/b/a CVF Land Investment was the successful bidder at
the February 28, 1989 Sheriff's Sale, and urged the additional
redemption amount before the trial court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
• 1. Whether sufficient evidence was presented at the
evidentiary hearing to support the lower court's finding that CVF
Land

Investment's expenditure of $12,905.00 for the grading,

reconfiguring and raising of the Galloway property constituted
"necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon
the property" within the meaning of Rule 69(f)(3) URCP, thus
justifying the addition thereof to the redemption amount.
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented
at the evidentiary hearing before the trial court to sustain a
finding that CVF Land Investment's expenditure of $12,905.00 for
the grading, reconfiguring and raising of the Galloway property was
a "reasonable sum" to expend for the "necessary maintenance, upkeep
or repair of improvements upon the property" within the meaning of
Rule 69(f)(3) URCP.

the

addition

3.

Whether Rule 69(f)(3) URCP requires or permits

of

pre-redemption

development

expenses

to

the

redemption amount if the court finds only that the redemptor has
2

been "benefitted" by such pre-redemption expenditures; if so,
whether there was sufficient evidence below the lower court to
sustain a finding that defendant/appellant Marcia S. Merrill was
"benefitted" by CVF Land Investments regrading and development of
the Galloway property prior to redemption.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
1.

Rule 69(f)(3) is determinative of the question

of whether or not CVF Land Investment, as purchaser of the Galloway
property at the February 28, 1989 sheriff's sale, could undertake
pre-construction development of the Galloway property during the
redemption period, and then add the cost thereof to the redemption
amount.

A copy of Rule 69(f)(3) is included in the Addendum as

Attachment 1.
2.

Salt Lake City Ordinance No. 18.64.050 is

determinative of the question whether or not CVF Land Investment
was under any obligation to regrade, level and raise the Galloway
property, incident to any City demolition order.

A copy of

Ordinance No. 18.64.050 is included in the Addendum as Attachment
2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case,
This appeal concerns the redemption of a parcel of

real property sold to satisfy a judgment entered in favor of Gunda
3

and Laurence Galloway, and against defendant Rowland H. Merrill
(owner of the Galloway property).

Defendant Marcia S. Merrill

(defendant Rowland H. Merrill's former wife) was named as a party
defendant due to her subordinate interest in the Galloway property
as a judgment creditor of Rowland Merrill.
The sheriff's sale of the Galloway property occurred
on February 28, 1989. The successful bidder at the sale was Gloria
Ruiz d/b/a/ CVF Land Investment. Six months thereafter, Marcia S.
Merrill sought to exercise her right of redemption under Rule 69(f)
URCP, by filing a Notice of Intent to Redeem with the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's office, and tendering the prescribed redemption
amount. She was prevented, though, by CVF Land Investment's filing
of an affidavit with the sheriff's office, claiming an additional
$13,405.20 due and payable for the redemption of the property. By
this appeal, defendant Merrill challenges whether the additional
amount may be exacted as part of the redemption price,
b.

Course of Proceedings.
Defendant Merrill deposited the undisputed portion

of the redemption amount with the court, and filed a petition
pursuant to Rule 69(f), URCP, for a court order determining the
proper redemption amount for the Galloway property.

Evidence

relating to defendant Marcia Merrill's petition was heard on
September, 13, 1989.
4

c.

Disposition at District Court.
Following the taking of evidence, on the lower court

entered an order increasing the redemption amount by $13,405.20
(together with interest on the additional amount), and ordering
defendant Marcia Merrill, as redemptor, to pay the additional
amount within the time prescribed by statute, on pain of forfeiture
of her redemption rights.

The court's ruling was reflected in a

written order dated September 15, 1989.
Defendant Merrill filed her notice of appeal within
the seven-day redemption period prescribed by Rule 69(f)(3) URCP.
She thereafter posted a letter of credit as security, and obtained
an order of stay pending appeal.
d.

Statement of Facts.
1.

On December 9, 1988, judgment was entered in

this action in favor of plaintiffs Gunda M. and Laurence Galloway,
and against Rowland H. Merrill, Jr. (R.138-140).
2.

On February 28, 1989, plaintiffs Gunda M. and

Laurence Galloway caused to be sold at sheriff's sale a parcel of
real property belonging to Mr. Merrill, and located in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, described as follows:
The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18,
19, 20 and 21, and 22, Block 2,
CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH ADDITION,
according to the official plats
thereof, recorded in the office of
5

the County Recorder of Salt Lake
County, Utah.
Commencing at the Southeast corner
Of Lot
22, Block 2, CHARLES S.
DESKYfS FOURTH ADDITION; thence
South 56 feet; thence West 136 feet;
thence North 23 feet; thence West 14
feet; thence North 33 feet; thence
East 150 feett to the point of
BEGINNING.
("the Galloway property").

A copy of the Order of Sheriff's Sale,

(R. 143-144) is included in the addenda hereto as Attachment 3.
3.

Respondent

CVF

Land

Investment

was

the

successful bidder at the sale, bidding in the amount of $28,000.00
(a copy of the Sheriff's Return of Sale, is included in the
addenda hereto as Attachment 4).
4.

Defendant/Appellant Marcia S. Merrill held a

subordinate lien in the Galloway property by reason of a Decree of
Divorce entered against defendant Rowland H. Merrill, Jr. on July
22, 1983.
5. On August 25, 1989, defendant/appellant Merrill
filed a Notice of Intent to Redeem with the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's office.
filing certificate

A copy of the Notice of Intent to Redeem with
(R. 154-174), is included in the Addendum

hereto as Attachment 5.
6.

Upon filing the Notice of Intent to Redeem,

defendant Merrill was presented by the Sheriff with an affidavit
6

purporting to be executed by CVF Land Investment, claiming payment
of general property taxes for 1988 in the amount of $500.04, and
demolition, removal of trash and associated regrading of the
property in the amount of $12,905.00.
7.

Defendant/Appellant

Merrill

thereupon

petitioned the court for a determination of the proper redemption
amount, and deposited the undisputed portion thereof with the
court.

A copy of the Petition for Redemption Amount (R. 206-211)

is included in the Addendum as Attachment 6; a copy of the Notice
of Deposit of Funds Into Court (R. 201-205) is included in the
Addendum as Attachment 7.
8.

Hearing

on

defendant/appellant

Merrill's

petition took place on September 13, 1989 at 2:30 p.m.

A copy of

the transcript thereof (R. 269) is included in the Addendum as
Attachment 8.

At the commencement of hearing, the facts set out

above were stipulated to by counsel (Tr. at pp. 2-3;).

The court

then heard evidence which established the following additional
facts:
(a) At the time CVF Land Investment purchased
the property from the Sheriff's Sale on
February

28,

1989,

the

property

was

occupied by a small, single level wood-

7

sided house of not more than 800 square
feet, (Tr. pp. 22-23);
(b) The house did not have a basement, but
only a crawl space between five and six
feet in depth underneath (Tr. p. 23);
(c) The entirety of the Galloway property, at
the time of purchase, was roughly level,
but was some 18 inches lower than the
adjacent roadways (Tr. pp. 24-25, 27);
(d) A few days following the sheriff's sale,
CVF Land Investment received a document
purporting to be a notice and order of
demolition

from

Salt

Lake

City

Corporation (Tr. pp. 6-7);
(e) CVF Land Investment thereupon turned the
notice and order over to Jay Hansen, an
independent

real

estate

broker,

for

compliance (Tr. pp. 7-8);
(f) CVF

Land

Investment

never

made

any

investigation of what needed to be done
to comply with an order of demolition
issued by Salt Lake City Corporation with
respect to the Galloway property, nor did
8

it attempt to assess the reasonableness
of any actual or proposed charges in
connection with any compliance therewith
(Tr. pp.10-12);
(g)

Jay Hansen, following a successful appeal
of

certain

city-imposed

landscape

requirements (Tr. p. 21 and Exhibit 4),
retained the services of Cliff Johnson
Excavating Company to demolish the house
and outbuildings on the Galloway property
(Tr. pp. 18-20);
(h)

In addition to demolishing the structures
on the property, Cliff Johnson Excavating
undertook to haul and spread 1,384 tons
of

fill

material

onto

the

Galloway

property, for which he charged CVF Land
Investment $7.00 per ton, for a total
charge of $9,690.00 (Tr. at p. 38, and
Exhibit

8);

material,

Cliff

in

addition
Johnson

to

fill

Excavating

charged CVF Land Investment $3,210.00 for
the actual demolition project, bringing

9

the total bill to $12,900-00 (Tr. pp. 89, Exhibit 2).
9.

The court then received expert testimony from

John Henry McCaughey, general manager

and vice president of

Northern Nevada Construction Company, regarding the requirements
for full compliance with Salt Lake City Demolition Orders and the
reasonable cost thereof.

Mr. McCaughey testified as follows:

(a) He had examined the Galloway property,
together with a house on a lot adjacent
to the Galloway property which was, in
all respects, identical

to the house

which had stood on the Galloway property
(Tr. at pp.

25-26, 30 and Exhibits 5, 6

and 7);
(b)

In his estimate, a reasonable charge for
the

demolition

of

such

a

structure,

including the filling in of the crawl
space underneath to the level of the
surrounding grade, could be accomplished
for $1,500.00, and no more than $1,800.00
(Tr. at pp. 30-31);
(c) This estimate would be based upon the
removal
10

of

the

structures

on

the

property, together with the placement of
some

60-70 yards of

fill

(or 90-105

tons), which would be sufficient to bring
the

crawl

space

to

the

grade

of

surrounding property (Tr. pp. 31-31, 37);
(d) Salt Lake City demolition requirements
did not include the raising or changing
of the level or grade of the entire lot
on which the structure to be demolished
is located (Tr. 32-33);
(e) City requirements did not include tree
removal as part of a demolition order,
and in fact encouraged, where possible,
that trees be left in place (Tr. p. 33).
10.

The court

received

no evidence whatever

establishing any of the following:
(a) That

Salt

instructed

Lake

City

had

ordered,

or otherwise requested CVF

Land Investment to bring in any more fill
material than would have been necessary
to bring any holes left by the demolition
of existing structures to the level of
the surrounding grade;
11

(b) That Salt Lake City had ordered CVF Land
Investment

to

perform

any

procedure,

in

conjunction

act
with

or
the

demolition of structures on the Galloway
property,

over

and

above

what

was

required by Salt Lake City ordinance (in
fact, quite the opposite—Salt Lake City
apparently
requirements

waived
in

landscaping

conjunction

with

the

demolition order, at the request of Mr.
Hansen—see Exhibit 4);
(c) That conditions on the Galloway property
were such that the raising or levelling
of the grade thereon was a necessary
prerequisite either to the maintenance or
the development of the Gcilloway property
for any identified purpose;
(d) That

$12,900.00

was

in

any

way

a

"reasonable price" for the demolition of
the structure

of

the sort which had

occupied the Galloway property at the
time of the February sheriff's sale, in
accordance with applicable Salt Lake City
12

ordinances (as noted above, evidence in
this

regard

was

directly

to

the

contrary);
(e) That $7.00 per ton was a "reasonable
price" for the fill material delivered to
the Galloway

property

(again, to the

contrary, Mr. McCaughey established that
the price of $7.00 per ton was clearly
excessive, even assuming the necessity of
placing it on the Galloway property to
begin with—see

ir 9(c) above);

(f) That the raising and levelling of the
entire Galloway property, as performed by
Cliff

Johnson

constituted,

Excavating

Company,

in any way, a procedure

necessary to the maintenance, upkeep, or
repair of improvements on the Galloway
property; or
(g) That

sums

Excavating

paid
Company

to

Cliff

were

in

Johnson
any

"reasonable" for the work performed.

13

way

11.
evidence,

and

Immediately

without

following the presentation of

permitting

any

closing

argument

from

counsel, the court entered the following ruling:
. . .and it is true it is probably
not too prudent to spend any money
on it until the redemption period is
passed. You know, what to do with
it. But the City tells her she has
to demolish, whether she really
reads the ordinance correctly or
whether she doesn't, she puts the
money into the property. And then
the people come in and redeem it,
and property has been improved, and
they receive the benefits of the
property, improvement or upkeep.
Maybe not considerably a benefit.
They might have wanted the house and
trees
and
whatever,
but
nevertheless, what has gone into it.
I really can't—you can't say
that's even reasonable. That seem
to be to be the question, not
whether it is, you know, perfectly
the right thing to do, but whether
it was reasonable. And I think it
was reasonable, and so I think I am
going to rule that the redemption
value here is the amount paid for
the property plus six percent plus
the taxes plus the 12,905 she paid
for the excavation and 10 percent
interest thereon. And that should
be the amount that's required for
the amount of redemption.
12.1.

On September 15, 1989, the court entered a

written order adjusting the redemption to be paid for the Galloway
property in accordance with its ruling on September 13, ($. 23814

240).

A copy of the Court's Order is included in the Addendum as

Attachment 9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
There

was

no

evidence

presented

in

the

proceedings before the trial court to sustain the court's finding
that CVF Land Investments1 improvements to the Galloway property
during the redemption period (including the hauling and spreading
of 1400 tons of prime-grade fill material for the purpose of
regrading and levelling the entire parcel of land) constituted
"necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon
the property" within the meaning of Rule 69(f)(3), URCP.
POINT II.
There was no evidence presented to the trial court
to sustain a finding that the expenditure of $12,900,00 by CVF
Land Investment in conjunction with the demolition of the existing
structures on the Galloway property, together with the raising and
re-grading of the entire parcel of land, constituted a "reasonable
sum for . . . necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any
improvements

upon

the property"

69(f)(3), URCP.

15

within

the meaning

of Rule

POINT III.
Rule 69(f)(3), URCP does not justify the addition
of

pre-redemption

redemption

development

amount

simply

upon

expenditures
a

finding

of

to

the

required

"benefit"

to

the

redemptors; rather, to be recoverable as part of the redemption
amount, expenditures on the redeemed property must constitute a
"reasonable sum" for "necessary maintenance, upkeep and repair of
improvements to the property"--in other words, maintenance of the
status quo between the date of sale and the end of the redemption
period.
In any event, no evidence was presented
lower

court

regrading

and

to

suggest

raising

that

of

the

CVF

Land

Galloway

Investments1
property

in

to the
massive
any

way

"benefitted" defendant/appellant Merrill as redemptor.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CVF LAND INVESTMENT'S IMPROVEMENTS TO THE
GALLOWAY PROPERTY CONSTITUTED COMMERCIAL
DEVELOPMENT, RATHER THAN "NECESSARY
MAINTENANCE, UPKEEP AND REPAIR OF '
IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE PROPERTY" AND THE COST
THEREOF MAY NOT BE ADDED TO THE
REDEMPTION AMOUNT
Rule

69(f)(3),

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

provides in part as follows:
The property [sold at
sale] may be redeemed

16

sheriff's
from the

Procedure,

purchaser within six months after
the sale by paying the amount of his
purchase with six percent added
thereon in addition, together with
the amount of any assessment or
taxes, and any reasonable sum for
fire
insurance
or
necessary
maintenance, upkeep or repair of
improvements upon the property which
the purchaser may have paid thereon
after the purchase, with interest on
such amounts. • . " (Emphasis
added).
The record of the trial court evidentiary proceeding on September
13,

1989 plainly establishes that the trial court's implied

finding1 that the post-sale improvements to the Galloway property
constituted

"necessary

maintenance,

upkeep

or

repair

of

improvements" was not only against the substantial weight of the
evidence, but was not supported by any evidence whatsoever.
The evidence of record is completely uncontested.
At the sheriff's sale, CVF Land Investment purchased approximately
one acre of land, occupied by an 800-square foot, single story
structure with a six-foot crawl space underneath, together with an

x

At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court began by
observing that the question to be determined included both the
necessity and reasonableness of repairs performed by CVF Land
Investment. The court's holding, however, focused exclusively on
whether sums expended were reasonable--the question of necessity
dropped out of the court's analysis entirely. Only in the court's
final, written order (Attachment 9 hereto) was an express finding
made that CVF Land Investment's expenditures on the Galloway
property were necessary for maintenance, upkeep or repair of
improvements thereon.
17

associated outbuilding.

Absent the alleged demolition order from

Salt Lake City Corporation, the only maintenance costs which CVF
Land Investment would be entitled to add to the redemption figure
would be those necessary for the reasonable upkeep of the house,
outbuilding and grounds.
CVF Land Investment claims, however, that it was
required to demolish the house by an alleged order of Salt Lake
City Corporation.

The order in question was never authenticated;

however, even assuming its authenticity, there is no evidence
whatsoever that CVF Land Investments was required (or could have
reasonably believed itself required) to do any more than demolish
existing structures on the Galloway property, in conformance with
applicable city ordinances.

The relevant procedure is framed by

18.65.059, Salt Lake City Ordinances:
A permit for demolition requires
that all materials comprising part
of
the
existing
structure(s),
including
the
foundation
and
footings, must be removed from the
site. The depression caused by the
removal of such debris must be
filled back and compacted to the
original grade, as approved by the
building
official,
with
fill
material
excluding
detrimental
amounts of organic material or
large-dimension
non-organic
material. (Emphasis added.)

18

In other words, CVF Land Investment would have been in full
compliance with the applicable City ordinance by removing the
house and outbuilding, and by filling in the six-foot crawl space
to the surrounding grade, with fill material of sufficient quality
to meet City standards. The evidence was unrebutted and unrefuted
that this task could have been accomplished at a price of between
$1,500 and $1,800.2
Rather than simply filling in the depression caused
by demolition of the home on the Galloway property and compacting
it to the original grade, however, CVF Land Investment undertook
a far more ambitious project.

It began commercial development of

the Galloway property by hauling in, grading and levelling 1,400
tons of prime-grade, $7.00-per-ton fill material to raise the
level of the entire lot to the level of Redwood Road, adjacent on
the east (an average rise of some 18 inches overall).

The purpose

of the additional fill is self-evident—it was not brought in to
maintain existing conditions, or to comply with any mandate under
Salt Lake City ordinance, but to commence full-scale construction
on the property preparatory to commercial development thereof.

2

0n
cross
examination,
defendant/appellant
Merrill's
demolition expert testified that, even including the removal of
trees (which is nowhere required in the alleged demolition order,
nor any applicable City ordinance), the price of the job could not
exceed $2,500.
19

Having voluntarily expended commercial development funds, CVF Land
Investment now expects defendant/appellant Merrill, as redemptor,
to reimburse it dollar-for-dollar as part of the redemption price.
The law has long been well settled that a purchaser
or transferee of real property, who takes title subject to what he
knows or should know to be a potentially superior claim thereto,
cannot claim compensation for improvements thereon. See generally
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Improvements, §18.
of a property at

In particular, the purchaser

judicial sale may not claim, from an aspiring

redemptor, compensation for improvements placed on the property
with knowledge of existing redemption rights.

In the case of

Sedlak v. Duda, 144 Neb. 567, 13 N.W.2d 892 (1944), the Nebraska
Supreme Court expressly held that the lower court had erred in
awarding the cost of improvements, performed by a purchaser at a
judicial sale, as part of the redemption price for the property:
For the purpose of redemption, a
purchaser in good faith at the
judicial sale, believing that he has
good title, will be entitled to
credit for improvements made upon
the property. But one who buys with
notice of the facts is not a
purchaser in good faith, within the
meaning of the rule, and is not
entitled to such credit.
13 N.W. 2d at p. 897.

20

Rule 69(f)(3) was plainly framed with an eye to the
foregoing

rule of law.

By its terms, the rule limits the

purchaser of real property to the recovery of expenditures for
maintenance, not for the cost of improvements.
CVF Land Investment, like any other purchaser at a
sheriff's sale conducted under Rule 69, took with full knowledge
that the sale was subject to statutory rights of redemption.

In

its decision to move forward with development of the property
during the redemption period, it had no legal right to assume that
it would

receive

guaranteed

reimbursement

in the event

the

framed

to prohibit

the

rights

by

property was redeemed from sale.
Rule
deliberate

69(f)(3) is also

subversion

redemption development.

of

assumption

costly

pre-

By limiting added redemption amounts to

sums expended for "necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of
improvements upon the property which the purchaser may have paid
thereon after the purchase", Rule 69(f)(3) prevents a purchaser
from making redemption prohibitively expensive by undertaking
costly development of the property during the redemption period,
and then demanding the price thereof as part of the redemption
amount.

Thus, for instance, CVF Land Investment would not be

entitled to demand the full fair market value of a restaurant,
warehouse, or office building on the Galloway property (had it
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managed

to finish construction thereof during the redemption

period).
expended,

By the same token, it is not entitled to recover sums
not

in

necessary

maintenance

or

upkeep,

but

in

preliminary grading and development for commercial purposes.
An analogy may be drawn tc> Utah's Eminent Domain
Code.

Under 78-34-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), the

right to just compensation for land taken under the power of
eminent domain is deemed to accrue as of the date of the service
of summons, and the amount of compensation is fixed on that date.
The

purpose

of

this

rule

is

to

prevent

a

landowner

from

undertaking hasty and costly development of his property following
the initiation of condemnation proceedings, for the purpose of
enhancing its fair market value and increasing the compensation
award.
By

the

same

token,

Rule

69(f)(3)

effectively

"freezes" the property as of the date of purchase—the purchaser
may recover, as a part of the redemption, only the necessary sums
in maintaining the status quo during the redemption period; there
is no

entitlement

to

inflate

the

redemption

amount

through

premature development of the property prior to the expiration of
the redemption period.
property

at

a

The law does not prohibit the purchaser of

sheriff's

sale

from

undertaking

immediate

development of the property; neither, however, does it guarantee
22

the purchaser dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of development sums
expended in the event of redemption.

Indeed, the trial court

itself acknowledged that "it is probably not too prudent to spend
any money on [property purchased at a sheriff's sale] until the
redemption

period

is

past"

(Transcript

at

p.

41).

Were

development expenditures properly recoverable as part of the
redemption

amount,

pre-redemption

development

would

not

be

imprudent--it would be a shrewd business ploy to block redemption.
CVF Land Investment's position in all of this, of
course,

is that

it was

not

actually

undertaking

commercial

development of the Galloway property at all, but merely complying
with what it understood to be a City requirement incident to the
alleged demolition order.

Mr. Hansen repeatedly attempted to

introduce hearsay testimony to buttress this understanding; the
Court, however, excluded all such testimony.
with, therefore, is an unexplained

What we are left

"understanding"

that City

ordinances required the depositing of 1,400 tons of fill on the
Galloway property in order to comply with a supposed demolition
order covering 1 880-square-foot house.

That such extensive

regrading procedures are not actually required by city-mandated
demolition procedures is established by the ordinance quoted at
page 19, above; CVF Land Investment cannot render the procedures
"necessary"

by

giving

voice

to
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a

groundless,

self-serving,

"understanding"

which

is

wholly

unreasonable

under

the

circumstances.
The evidence is clear and uncontested
expended

by

CVF

Galloway

property

Land
were

Investment
not

that sums

for

the

development

necessary

for

the

of

maintenance

the
of

improvements on the Galloway property, and may not be awarded as
part of a redemption amount.
POINT II
EVEN ASSUMING THE NECESSITY OF CVF
LAND INVESTMENTS PRE-REDEMPTION
EXPENDITURES ON THE GALLOWAY PROPERTY,
THE AMOUNT THEREOF WAS NOT REASONABLE
Rule 69(f)(3) URCP, does not permit the wholesale
addition, to the statutory amount required of a re^demptor, of all
sums which the purchaser claims were necessary for maintenance,
upkeep and repair of improvements to the property.

Rather, it

limits recovery to those sums which were reasonably devoted to
such purposes.
At

the

hearing

before

the

lower

court,

defendant/appellant Merrill established, by unchallenged evidence,
that CVF Land Investments1 expenditures on the Galloway property,
even

assuming

for

the

sake

of

argument

that

they

had

been

necessary for "maintenance, upkeep and repair of improvements",
were wholly unreasonable.

Charges by Cliff Johnson Excavating
24

Company for demolition alone (leaving out the 1400 tons of fill
materials deposited on the property) was over $3,000.00--twice the
amount which the only expert witness before the Court testified
would be reasonable for such a job.
The only evidence adduced by CVF Land Investment
regarding the reasonableness of the charges incurred was Mr.
Hansen's declaration that he had obtained two other bids before
hiring Cliff Johnson Excavating.

No testimony was offered as to

who the other bids came from; what the amount thereof was; whether
the amount charged by Cliff Johnson Excavating represented any
sort of recognized standard in the industry (Mr. McCaughey in
fact, directly rebutted this); or anything else which might have
given

the

lower

reasonableness

of

court

guidance

the urged

in

assessing

charges.

the

objective

Defendant/Merrill

was

precluded, however, from bringing this lack of evidence to the
Court's attention, due to the court's refusal to accept closing
argument before issuing its ruling.
It

is

submitted,

in

short,

that

the

Court's

decision that charges incurred by CVF Land Investment in their
development of the Galloway property (even if necessary) were
"reasonable" was unsustained by any evidence whatever.
basis alone, the court's ruling must be reversed.
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On this

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT DEFENDANT/
APPELLANT RECEIVED THE "BENEFIT" OF
CVF LAND INVESTMENT'S DEVELOPMENT OF
THE GALLOWAY PROPERTY IS BOTH IRRELEVANT
AND UNTRUE
While it paid lip service to the legal requirements
of

reasonableness

and

necessity

in conjunction

with

CVF

Land

Investment's claimed charges, the trial court plainly ruled based
on the impression that, since CVF Land Investment had put $13,000
worth

of

improvements

into

the

property,

and

since

defendant/appellant Merrill now wished to redeem that property,
she was ipso facto receiving the "benefit" of the pre-redemption
development,

and

should

be

required

to

pay

for

it.

This

conclusion not only ignores applicable law, but is not based on
any evidence presented during the hearing.
As

already

noted,

the

statutory

test

for

recoverability of expenditures as part of the redemption figure is
strictly limited—the purchaser may recoup only reasonable sums
expended

for

the necessary

improvements on the property

maintenance, upkeep

and

repair

(in other words, maintaining

of
the

status quo ante pending the expiration of the redemption period).
A

purchaser

may

not

undertake

major

development

during

a

redemption period, either with the assurance that an aspiring
redemptor will act as the purchaser's "guarantor" in the event of
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redemption, or for the purpose of defeating redemption by making
it cost prohibitive.

That the redemptor may (or may not--see

below) receive the "benefit" of pre-redemption development is not
a qualifying factor.
Neither is it invariably true. In this case, there
was no evidence that CVF Land Investments' depositing of 1,400
tons

of

property

seven-dollar-per-ton
in

any

way

fill

furthered

material

on

the

defendant/appellant

Galloway
Merrill's

intended use of the property, enhanced its value by $13,000 (or by
any other figure), or otherwise inured to defendant/appellant's
benefit in any way.

Indeed, had defendant/appellant Merrill been

aware that the court even regarded the supposed "benefit" issue to
be relevant, she would have presented testimony that she intended
no use of the Galloway property which entailed the raising of its
entire grade to the level of surrounding streets, could not (by
reason

of

CVF

Land

Investments' development

work) sell the

Galloway property to a third-party purchaser for appreciably more
money, and in fact did not benefit in any respect from the
development work undertaken.
The value of the work done during the redemption
period inured to CVF Land Investment alone; as redemptor, Marcia
Merrill will realize none of that value either through the use or
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sale of the Galloway property, and should not be required to pay
it as part of the redemption amount.
CONCLUSION
The purchaser of property at a sheriff1 s sale is
subject,

for

lienholders1
redemption

months

statutory
period,

development

at

reimbursement
redemption.
statute,

six

his
for

following

rights

of

the

purchase,

redemption.

the

purchaser

proceeds

own

risk;

law,

his

by

development

costs

he
as

to

junior

During
with
may
the

the

property
not

exact

price

of

Rather, he is limited to specific amounts set by

which

include

only

sums

expended

for

necessary

maintenance, upkeep and repair of existing improvements on the
property as of date of sale.

To be recoverable, moreover, such

sums must be reasonable in amount.
The lower court, simply put, ignored the foregoing
standard completely.
Merrill

with

the

It burdened defendant/appellant Marcia S.
entire

cost

of

post-sale,

pre-redemption

improvements undertaken by CVF Land Investment on the Galloway
property.

The work performed was not considered in terms of

actual necessity; neither were the amounts expended evaluated in
terms of reasonableness.

The court concluded only that CVF Land

Investment (or more properly a contracting real estate broker) may
have believed that the re-grading of the Galloway property to have
28

been a City requirement (a fact nowhere established of record, and
directly

contradicted

by expert

testimony

and

the

unambiguous

language of applicable ordinances), and that, as redemptor, Marcia
S. Merrill might benefit from the pre-redemption work performed
(again, nowhere established of record).
The

lower

court

committed

manifest

error

in

saddling defendant/appellant Merrill with CVF Land Investments'
development costs on the Galloway property during the redemption
period.
the

Defendant/appellant Merrill is entitled to a reversal of

lower

court's

order,

and

a

remand

of

this

case

for

recalculation of the redemption amount in accordance with the law,
and with the evidence presented at the September 13, 1989 hearing.
DATED this

j ^

day of January, 1990.

WATKISS & SAPERSTKEN

VINCENT^ef. ^ M P T O N
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant Marcia S. Merrill
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or
employed by the law firm of WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN, 310 South Main
Street,

Suite

1200, Salt

Lake

City,

Utah,

and

that

in

said

capacity and pursuant to Rule 21(d) Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, a true copy of the attached Appellant's Brief was caused
to be served upon:
Jax H. Pettey
180 South 300 West, #313
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
by depositing a properly addressed envelope containing the same in
the U.

S. Mails, postage

prepaid

January, 1990.
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thereon

this

if/

day

of
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successive weeks immediately preceding the sale,
in some newspaper published in the county, if
there is one.
(2) Postponement If at the time appointed
for the sale of any real or personal property on
execution the officer shall deem it expedient and
for the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of purchasers, or other
sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from
time to time, until the same shall be completed;
and in every such case he shall make public declaration thereof at the time and place previously
appointed for the sale, and if such postponement
is for a longer time than one day, notice thereof
shall be given in the same manner as the original
notice of such sale is required to be given.
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be made at auction to the
highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock
a.m. and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property
has been sold to satisfy the execution no more
shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution nor his deputy shall become a purchaser,
or be interested in any purchase at such sale.
When the sale is of personal property capable of
manual delivery it must be within view of those
who attend the sale, and it must be sold in such
parcels as are likely to bring the highest price;
and when the sale is of real property, consisting
of several known lots or parcels, they must be
sold separately; or when a portion of such real
property is claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold separately, such portion must
be thus sold. All sales of real property must be
made at the courthouse of the county in which
the property, or some part thereof, is situated.
The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may
also direct the order in which the property, real
or personal, shall be sold, when such property
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of
articles which can be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such directions.
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid
shall be deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the
purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him
for the property struck off to him at a sale under
execution, the officer may again sell the property
at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss
is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay,
in addition to being liable on such bid, is guilty of
a contempt of court and may be punished accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his discretion, thereafter reject
any other bid of such person.
(5) Personal property. When the purchaser
of any personal property pays the purchase
money, the officer making the sale shall deliver
the property to the purchaser (if such property is
capable of manual delivery) and shall execute
and deliver to him a certificate of sale and payment. Such certificate shall state that all right,
title and interest which the debtor had in and to
such property on the day the execution or attachment was levied, and any right, title and interest
since acquired, is transferred to the purchaser.
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: ( D a particular description of the real property sold; (2) the price
paid by him for each lot or parcel if sold separately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to

the effect that all right, title, interest and claim
of the judgment debtor in and to the property j.
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where
such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall
be stated also. A duplicate of such certificate
shall be filed for record by the officer in the offiCe
of the recorder of the county. The real property
sold shall be subject to redemption, except where
the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two.
years' unexpired term, in which event said sale 13
absolute.
(f) Redemption from sale.
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be
redeemed by the following persons or their suc.
cessors in interest: < 1) the judgment debtor; (2) a
creditor having a lien by judgment or mortgage
on the property sold, or on some share or part
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property
was sold.
(2) Redemption; how made. At the time of
redemption the person seeking the same may
make payment of the amount required to the person from whom the property is being redeemed,
or for him to the officer who made the sale, or his
successor in office. At the same time the redemp.
tioner must produce to the officer or person from
whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his
notice to the officer: ( D a certified copy of the
docket of the judgment under which he claims
the right to redeem, or, if he redeems upon a
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the
record thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an
assignment, properly acknowledged or proved
where the same is necessary to establish his
claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his agent
showing the amount then actually due on the
lien.
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be
paid. The property may be redeemed from the
purchaser within six months after the sale on
paying the amount of his purchase with 6 percent
thereon in addition, together with the amount of
any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum
for fire insurance and necessary maintenance,
upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the
property which the purchaser may have paid
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking
redemption, other than the judgment under
which said purchase was made, the amount of
such lien, with interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to
whether any sum demanded for redemption is
reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out
of which execution or order authorizing the sale
was issued, and at the same time file with the
court a petition setting forth the item or items
demanded to which he objects, together with his
grounds of objection; and thereupon the court
shall enter an order fixing a time for hearing of
such objections. A copy of the petition and order
fixing time for hearing shall be served on the
purchaser not less than two days before the day
of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the
court shall enter an order determining the
amount required for redemption. In the event an
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the
clerk is required, the person seeking redemption
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18.64.030

request which is acceptable to the building official. A copy of the relocation plan must be delivered to each tenant. If the building official
becomes aware that the relocation plan has not
been delivered to the tenants, and/or is not being
followed, the credit shall be forfeited. (Ord. 88-85
§3, 1985: prior code §5-8-3)

posting of a bond, erection of fences, securing,
etc., to guarantee the site does not create a hazard:
B. That new construction will shortly commence and approves the continuance of the protective pedestrian walkway. (Ord. 88-85 § 5,
1985: prior code §5-8-5)

18.64.040

Closing of sewer lateral and
utilities.
Prior to the commencement of any demolition or moving, the permittee must plug all sewer
laterals at or near sidewalk lines as staked out by
the department of public utilities. No excavation
shall be covered until such plugging is approved
by the department or by the building official. The
permittee shall further insure all utility services
to the structure and/or premises have been shut
off and meters removed prior to commencement
of work. (Ord. 88-85 §4,1985: prior code § 5-8-4)
18.64.050

Site treatment after completion of
project.
A permit for demolition requires that all materials comprising part of the existing structure^),
including the foundation and footings, must be
removed from the site. The depression caused by
removal of such debris must be filled back and
compacted to the original grade, as approved by
the building official, with fill material excluding
detrimental amounts of organic material or
large-dimension nonorganic material. The demolition work must be completed, include filling
and leveling back to grade and removal of
required pedestrian walkways and fences, within
the permit period provided in Section 302(d) set
out in Section 18.64.010, or its successor, unless
the building official finds:
A. That any part of the foundation or building or site will form an integral part of a new
structure to be erected on the same site for which
plans have already been approved by the building division, in which case he/she may approve
plans for appropriate adjustment, and may
impose reasonable conditions including the
(Salt Lake City 1-88)
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18.64.060

Enforcement exceptions—Appeal
rights.
A. Enforcement Exceptions. Properties
involved in enforcement action by the city which
result in city-sponsored demolition pursuant to
this title, the Uniform Housing Code, or the
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings Code, are
relieved of the obligation set forth in Uniform
Building Code Section 302(b)(2) to (d) and (e), as
set out in Section 18.64.010 of this chapter, or
successor sections.
B. Right to Appeal. All parties impacted by
this chapter can appeal the provisions thereof to
the housing advisory and appeals board (HAAB)
as follows:
1. The owner of a property which is to be
demolished may appeal the provisions of Sections 18.64.010, 18.64.020 and 18.64.050 of this
chapter, or successor sections. A party who has a
financial or legal interest in the proposed demolition may appeal the building official's decision.
All appeals of this chapter will be made to the
HAAB. The HAAB may overrule the building
official or otherwise may grant relief upon evidence of extreme hardship, technical constraints,
or other special mitigating circumstances. It may
waive the landscape requirement or grant lessthan-full compliance. In granting relief from the
landscaping requirement, the HAAB shall consider the impact that noncompliance, or lessthan-full compliance, would have on the area in
which the building is located.
a. An owner claiming a hardhip or other special circumstance exists may file an appeal with
the building official on a form provided in the
division of building and housing services.

Attachment
3

NOTICE OF REAL ESTATE SALE
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
In the
District
Court of the Third Judicial District In and for
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
GUilOA M. GALLOWAY and LAURENCE GALLOWAY
VS
ROWLAND It. MERRILL, JR.; GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY
OF UTAH, Trustee; BRIAN STEFFEMSEN, Attorney at Law,
LAND ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; JOSEPH
R. BRUNETTI; ROBERT L. LORD; ROBERT L. LORD, Attorney
at Law; ROBERT B. BROWN, Attorney at Law; APOSHIAN,
SNIDEMAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.; AMERICAN HOTEL
DEVELOrCP.:, INC.; NORTH TEMPLE LTD.; PLASTER
DE'COR, INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; THE STATE
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B.
BROWN; and JOHN DOES 1-10

ORDER OF SALE
DISTRICT COURT
CIVIL NO. C88-1017

To bo sold at Sheriff's Sale at the County Courthouse, ZhO East ^00 South In
the Third District Court Building, 2nd door.
In the City and County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, on the 28th day of February, 1989
at 12 o'clock noon of said
day, all right, title and interest of said defendant
, In and to that certain
piece or parcel of real property
situate In Salt Lake County, State of Utah, described
as follows, to-wi t:
The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18, 19, 2 0 , and 21,
and 22, Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH ADDITION
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 2 2 ,
Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKYS FOURTH ADDITION; thence
South 56 feet; thence West 136 feet: thence North
23 feet; thence West 14 feet; thence North 33 feet;
thence East 150 feet to BEGINNING.

Purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 26th
day of January
1939
II.D. "f'LTE" IIAYWARD, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Sta'te/of Utah.

Dy
JAX H. PETTEY
Attorney for Plaintiff

>t

—"""Deputy Sheriff

TCEITH L. BUCKNW
BUCKN
Docket No.
7906

Date of first publication

2-3-89
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REAL ESTATE, ORDER OF SALE RETURH
In the District
STATE OF UTAH

J^

Court
SHERIFF'S OFFICE

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE '

CIVIL No.
C88-1017

I hereby certify and return that I received the attached Order of Sale and
Decree of Foreclosure on the 25th day of January, 1989
I posted written Notice particularly describing said property for Twentyone days In three public places of the Precinct where the same is situated, on
the property and In the County Courthouse at the place of sale.

I published a

copy of the notice once a week for four successive weeks preceding said sale in
the

Salt Lake Times

f

a newspaper of general circulation published in the

County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, proof of such publication being attached.
On the 28th day of February, 1989 at 12:00 o'clock noon of said day I did
attend and offered for sale at public auction the property as described and sold
the same to Gloria Ruiz dba CVFLAND Investment Co.
for the sum of $28,000.00

lawful money of the United States; said purchaser

being the highest bidder.
I have given to said purchaser a Certificate of Sale and have caused a duplicate Certificate to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of
Utah.
I herewith return said Order of Sale to court without further service by me,
with judgment

fully

satisfied as follows, to-wit:

Principal
$ 17,202.11
Commission
$
425.00
Interest
3,671.08
Overbid
$
512.13
Attorneys fees
2,859.99
Overbid turned over to Clerk of
Cost
s
286.50
Court-Check attached.
Sheriffs fees
171.86
Late fees
507.50
Taxes
2,363.83
Total judgment
$ 27,062.87
Bid
$ 28,000.00
Oated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of March, 1989
N.D. "Pete" Hayward, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
\( ? "(A <^JUvC \ ^ \
Deputy Sheriff
KEITH L. BUCKNER'
oe;.<TIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY Or ,
Docket No. 7906
-VAGINAL DOCUMENT O N FILE IN THE TH;-~~~
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE C
/
JTAH. /
, ^ "
^~^
By
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VINCENT C. RAMPTON #2684
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171
Telephone (801) 363-3300
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GUNDA M. GALLOWAY and
LAURENCE GALLOWAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

•

ROWLAND H. MERRILL, JR.;
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH,
Trustee;
BRIAN
STEFFENSEN,
Attorney
at
Law;
LAND
ACQUISITION
AND
DEVVELOPMENT
COMPANY; JOSEPH R. BRUNETTI;
ROBERT L. LORD, Attorney at
Law; ROBERT B. BROWN, Attorney
at Law; APOSHIAN, SNIDEMAN &
ASSOCIATES,
INC.;
AMERICAN
HOTEL DEVELOPERS, INC.; NORTH
TEMPLE LTD.7 PLASTER DE'COR,
INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; THE
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B. BROWN;
AND JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CERTIFICATE OF FILING OF
NOTICE OF INTENT TO REDEEM

Civil No. C88-1017
Judge Scott Daniels

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by
the law firm of Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main, Suite 1200,
Salt Lake City, Utah and that the attached Notice of defendant
Marcia S. Merrill's Intent to Redeem in the above-entitled matter
was caused to be filed with the office of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff by hand delivery on the 25th day of August, 1989.

VTNCEN^S^^KNIPTON

SUBSCRIBED and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s 25th day of August,
1989
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
June 27, 1991

2
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VINCENT C. RAMPTON #2684
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171
Telephone (801) 363-3300
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

W

—

f Si
in

GUNDA M. GALLOWAY and
LAURENCE GALLOWAY,

•

Plaintiffs,
vs.

D

0
in

tf

<
<
in

ROWLAND H. MERRILL, JR.;
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH,
Trustee;
BRIAN
STEFFENSEN,
Attorney
at
Law;
LAND
ACQUISITION AND DEWELOPMENT
COMPANY; JOSEPH R. BRUNETTI;
ROBERT L. LORD, Attorney at
Law; ROBERT B. BROWN, Attorney
at Law; APOSHIAN, SNIDEMAN &
ASSOCIATES,
INC.;
AMERICAN
HOTEL DEVELOPERS, INC.; NORTH
TEMPLE LTD.; PLASTER DE'COR,
INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; THE
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B. BROWN;
AND JOHN DOES 1-10, %J {J

PETITION FOR DETERMINATION
OF REDEMPTION AMOUNT

fau*

Judge Scott Daniels

Btfj.
UPON.

ij}r t

Q6fit C yP^-S

H\&T£

fkasoJ

SINOT-OEPUipt-GefKJABCt

Defendants.

0\f

Civil No. C88-1017

^%tOUNTY. UTAH
OEPUfv

J^ctjf/K^Jt

Defendant Marcia S. Merrill, by counsel and pursuant to
Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions the court
for a judicial determination of the full amount necessary to
redeem, from the Sheriff's sale on February 28, 1989 in the
above-entitled action, the following conducted parcel of real
property, located in Salt Lake City, State of Utah:
The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20 and
21, and 22, Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH
ADDITION, according to the official plats
thereof, recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 22,
Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH ADDITION;
thence South 56 feet; thence West 136 feet;
thence North 23 feet; thence West 14 feet;
thence North 33 feet; thence East 150 feet to
the point of BEGINNING.
("The Galloway Property").
Defendant Marcia S. Merrill petition is based upon the
following:
1.

The Galloway property was sold at Sheriff's sale to

Gloria Ruiz dba C.V.F. Land Investments Co. by Sheriff's sale on
February 28, 1989, (a copy of the recorded Notice of Sale is
attached as Exhibit 1).
2.

The purchase price for the property at the Sheriff's

sale was $28,000.00.

2

3.

On or about August 17, 1989, counsel for Marcia S.

Merrill notified C.V.F. Land Investment Co. of her intent to
redeem the property under Rule 69(f), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
4.

While, between August 17 and August 25, 1989, counsel

for Marcia S. Merrill had conversations with a representative of
C.B.S. Land Investment Co., no final agreement was reached with
respect to the redemption of the Galloway property from sale, or
the amount to be paid therefore.
5.

On August 25, 1989, counsel for Marcia S. Merrill

contacted the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office for the purpose
of finalizing redemption procedures, and was informed that C.V.F.
Land

Investment Co. was claiming the payment of taxes and

improvement expenses on the Galloway property which had not
theretofore been disclosed to Marcia S. Merrill or her counsel.
6.

Under law, August 25, 1989, is the last day for

redemption from sale of the Galloway property.
7.

Marcia S. Merrill acknowledges the following amounts

as necessary for redemption of the Galloway property from sale:
A.

Purchase price at execution sale -

$20,000.00

3

B.

6 percent surcharge required by Rule

69(f),

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

$1,680-00
C.

Interest at 10 percent per annum

through August 25, 1989 - $1,447.41.
D.

Total - $31,127.41

8.

Defendant Marcia S. Merrill has made reasonable

inquiry regarding further assessments and taxes against the
Galloway

property

and

had

been

notified

that

none

were

outstanding.
9.

Defendant Marcia S. Merrill objects to any further

charges being included in the redemption amount, in that the
surcharges have not been timely brought to her attention or
established by proper documentation.
10.

The amount of $31,127.41 is herewith tendered into

court.
Wherefore, defendant Marcia S. Merrill petitions the court
under Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to enter an
order fixing a time for hearing of defendant Merrill's objections
to the claimed redemption amount for the Galloway property; to
take such evidence as the court deems necessary, at the time that
is

established

for

the

hearing,

to

determine

the

proper

redemption amount for the Galloway property, and to enter an
4

appropriate order establishing said amount, all as provided by
law.
DATED this 25th day of August, 1989.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

VINCENT^ BRAMPTON
Attorri^y for Defendant
Marcia S. Merrill
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of
Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, and that in said capacity had the foregoing
Petition for Determination of Redemption Amount hand delivered
to C.V.F. Land Investment Co., 1335 East 4130 South, Sal^ Lake
City, Utah 84117 on August 25, 1989.
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STATE OF UTAH
SS*

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

CONSTABLE'S RETURN

* being flrsi

I* KORTNEY A* SATO

duiv sworn on cath depose and say*

I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable of the Fifth Precinct* County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah* a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of
service herein* and no* a party to or interested in the within action*
I received the within and hereto annexed PETITION FOR DETERMINATION *
AUGUST

on the 25 day of

• 1989* tri served the same upon RUIZ* GLORIA DBA CVF LAND INVESTMENT CO**

a within named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said
PETITION FOR DETERMINATION *

* by delivering to and leaving a true copy of said PETITION FOR DETERMINATION *

for the defendant with RUIZ* GLORIA DBA CVF LAND INVESTMENT CO., a suitable person over the age of
14 years* RESIDING ai: the usual Place of RESIDENCE of said defendant* personally
this 28 day of AUGUST

* 1989* at 1335 E* 4130 S*

County of Salt Lake* State of Utah*
I further certify that at the time of such service of the PETITION FOR DETERMINATION
I endorsed the date and Place of service and added ay name and official title thereto*
* of Redemption Amount

Dated this 28 day of AUGUST

* 1989

JOHN A* SINDT
Constable's Office* Salt Lake County

/V£

Subscribed and s*orn to before me thi
s 28 day of AUGUST ^C^W9*
MY Commission Expires* April 1* 1992

Y.&/
\<y
mty of Salt Lake

Notary Pub I it
* * »
Fee's
Service

3.75

Hi lease

TOTAL

99100

15 HA

3.75

COURT DATE! 9/13/89
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VINCENT C. RAMPTON #2684
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171
Telephone (801) 363-3300

!

-i ; - " - :

BY

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GUNDA M. GALLOWAY and
LAURENCE GALLOWAY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROWLAND H. MERRILL, JR.;
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH,
Trustee;
BRIAN
STEFFENSEN,
Attorney
at
Law;
LAND
ACQUISITION
AND DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY; JOSEPH R. BRUNETTI;
ROBERT L. LORD, Attorney at
Law; ROBERT B. BROWN, Attorney
at Law; APOSHIAN, SNIDEMAN &
ASSOCIATES,
INC.;
AMERICAN
HOTEL DEVELOPERS, INC.; NORTH
TEMPLE LTD.; PLASTER DE'COR,
INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; THE
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B. BROWN;
AND JOHN DOES 1-10, £J-,J(
"Defendants.

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO
COURT

Civil No. C88-1017
Judge Scott Daniels

OATE P'JP'fl

TIMP

/**

UPON.
SINOT-OEPI
EJU»-6ejj5«BLt^L_C3UNTY..UTAH
U
ITV

TO; Gloria Ruiz dba C.V.F. Land Investment Company:
Notice is hereby given that defendant Marcia S. Merrill has,

as of the date of this notice, deposited with the Clerk of the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the sum of $31,127.41, being the undisputed portion of the
amount required to redeem from the Sheriff's sale of February 28,
1989, the following described parcel of real property, located
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18, 19,
21, and 22, Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S
ADDITION, according to the official
thereof, recorded in the office of the
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah.

20 and
FOURTH
plats
County

Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 22,
Block 2, CHARLES S. DESKY'S FOURTH ADDITION;
thence South 56 feet; thence West 136 feet;
thence North 23 feet; thence West 14 feet;
thence North 33 feet; thence East 150 feet to
the point of BEGINNING.
Said deposit was made in conjunction with defendant Merrill's
petition for judicial determination of the amount required for
redemption, as provided under Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
DATED this 25th day of August, 1989.
WATKISS &

ITINCEN^V^AMPTON
Attorney for Defendant
Marcia S. M e r r i l l

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of
Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, and that in said capacity had the foregoing
Notice of Deposit to Court was hand delivered to C.B.F. Land
Investments, 1335 East 4130 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 on
August 25, 1989.

VCR\HOTDIP.MSM
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC
98/25/89 TIME: 13:35 CLERK: JMB
CASE: 886901017LM
PLTFF/PETi GALLOWAY? GUNDA M.
DFNDT/RES: MERRILL? ROWLAND H. JR.
JUDGE: S C O H DANIELS
Befiimini Bal:
PAYOR: MARCIA S MERRILL
AMT. Received:
Other TrstNO: 127 Check:

31? 127.41

End Balance:

.00

31?127.41
31?127.41

COURT TENDER
Receipt No: 891646168
SAVE THIS RECEIPT **** SAVE THIS RECEIPT

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC
98/25/89 TIME: 13:35 CLERK: JMB
CASE: 888981817LM
PLTFF/PET: GALLOWAY? GUNDA M.
DFNDT/RES: MERRILL? ROWLAND H. JR.
JUDGE: SCOTT DANIELS
Besirming Bal:
PAYOR: MARCIA S MERRILL
AMT. Received:
Other TrstNO: 127 Check:

31i127.41

End Balance:

.38

31?127.41
31?127.41

COURT TENDER
Receipt No: 891648188
SAVE THIS RECEIPT **** SAVE THIS RECEIPT

STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

CONSTABLE'S RETURN

I* KORTNEY A* SATO

• being first duiv sworn on oath depose and say*"
,

I am a duly 2PPo'\»A ~'i Deputy Constable of ihe Fifth Precinct, County of Salt Lake.
S^ate of Utah* a citizen of vhe United States over the age of 21 years at the time of
service herein* and not a party to or interested in the within action*
I received the within and hereto annexed NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO COURT
AUGUST

on the 25 day of

* 1989* and served the same upon RUIZ* GLORIA DBA CVF LAND INVESTMENT CO.,

a within named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said
NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO COURT

* by delivering to and leaving a true copy of said NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO COURT

for the defendant with RUIZ* GLORIA DBA CW LAND INVESTMENT CO** a suitable person over the age of
14 years* RESIDING at the usual Place of RESIDENCE of said defendant, personally
this 28 day of AUGUST

* 1989* at 1335 E* 4130 S*

County of Salt Lake* State of Utah*
I further certify that at the time of such service of the NOTICE OF DEPOSIT INTO COURT
I endorsed the date and Place of service and added my name and official title thereto*
Liate6 this 28 day of AUGUST

, 1989

JOHN A* SINDT
Constable's Office* Salt Lake County

22fe£> <?Jte
Deputy

v ^ n V fi *S*.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28 day of AUGUST

^ W ? ^ t y &

MY Commission Expires*

April 1* 1992*

[County of Salt Lake

Notary Public

\<rti}tt of u w

s®

Fee's
Service

'-tUMM**

3*75

Mi leaqe

TOTAL

99100

15 MA

%

3.75

COURT DATEJ

9/13/89
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 13ISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

GUNDA M. GALLOWAY and,
LAURENCE GALLOWAY,
Plaintiff,

]
)
]
CASE NO. C88--1017

VS.

ROWLAND H. MERRIL, JR.,;
]
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, 1
TRUSTEE; BRIAN STEFFENSEN,
ATTORNEY AT LAW; LAND
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY; JOSEPH R. BURNETTI;
ROBERT L.. LORD; ROBERT L. LORD
ATTORNEY AT LAW; ROBERT B. BROWN,
ATTORNEY AT LAW; APOSHIAN,
SNIDEMAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.;
AMERICAN HOTEL DEVELOPERS, INC.; '
NORTH TEMPLE LTD.; PLASTER
DE'COR, INC.; MARCIA S. MERRILL; ]
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH; ROBERT B. BROWN;
and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendant.
* * * * •k

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

SALT LAKE CIT^i, UTAH

September 13 , 1989

NORA S .

WORTHEN, C S R ,

RPR

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
JAX H. PETTEY

ORTON S> PETTEY
3098 Highland Drive, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
VINCENT C. RAMPTON
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City,

Utah

84101-2171
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 13, 1989; P.M. SESSION

2

THE COURT:

The matter before the Court is Gunda

3

M. Galloway and Lawrence Galloway versus Rowland H. Merril

4

and others, C88-1017, as I understand it before the Court

5

on a evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of

6

redemption; is that correct?

7

MR. RAMPTON:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. RAMPTON:

10

plaintiff.

Correct, your Honor.
Is the plaintiff ready to proceed?
Well, it's not proceeding as

This is the redemptor versus the purchaser.

11 I

THE COURT:

12

MR. RAMPTON:

The proposed redemptor, Marcia

MR. PETTEY:

Jax Pettey, and I represent the

13
14
15

You represent the —

Merrill.

purchaser Gloria Ruiz.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. RAMPTON:

You can proceed.
Your Honor, just briefly, because I

18

know we are short on time, this is an evidentiary proceeding

19

to help determine the redemption amount on a parcel of

20

property located in Salt Lake County at 145 North on

21 I
22

Redwood Road.
The property was sold in this action in a

23

Sheriff's sale of February 28, 1989 to Gloria Ruiz

24

d/b/a CVF Land Investment.

25

junior judgment lien against the property and wishes to

Marcia S.

Merrill holds a

1

redeem the property, which she filed a Notice of Intention

2

to do so with the Sheriff on August 25, 1985, within the

3

time period prescribed by law.

4

The redemption amount, which she tendered at that

5

time, was the sale price, which was $28,000, six percent,

6

which is $1,680 interest on both of those figures at 10

7

percent through August 25th, which came to $1,447.41. So

8

the total tender was $31,127.41.

9

On the day of redemption, I learned for the first

10

time that an affidavit had been filed with the Salt Lake

11 1

County Sheriff's Office by CVF Land Investment, claiming

12 I

that an additional $520 was due for taxes paid on the

13

property during the redemption period, and also 12,900 some

14

odd dollars, nearly $13,000, for necessary expenses incident

15

to maintenance upkeep, and repair of the property.

16

no information at that time as to whether or not these were

17

valid charges, so we filed, or rather tendered, a deposit of

18

redemption amount to the court, sought and obtained this

19

hearing date.

20

We had

A few matters have since come to light, but I

21 J

think we can enter by stipulation, first of all, that the

22

property was purchased by Gloria Ruiz.

23

$28,000 at a Sheriff's sale on February 28;

24

of the $31,127.41 has been deposited with the Court pursuant

25

to this hearing; that in fact CVF Land Investment did pay

nAimrinnn

•» T-»

It was purchased for
that the amount

1

property taxes during the redemption period in the amount of

2 J

$500.20. We don't challenge that, so that amount should be

3

awarded in addition to what has already been tendered.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. RAMPTON: Plus six percent.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. RAMPTON:

8

THE COURT:

9 J

MR. RAMPTON:

10
11

Plus six percent of that?

Plus 10 percent?
Right.
So the question is the 12,000?
So the question is the repair.

69(f)(3) states the following:
"The property may be redeemed from the

12

purchaser within six months after the sale on

13

paying the amount of his purchase with six

14

percent thereon in addition, together with the

15

amount of any assessment or taxes, and any

16

reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary

17

maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvement

18

upon the property which the purchaser may have

19

paid thereon after the purchase, with interest

20

on such amounts."

21

Rule

And it is our contention the evidence will not

22

establish that the additional sums which have been claimed

23

in this matter will require that —

24

the extent they may have been necessary, they are

25

unreasonably high and should not be awarded any part of the

were not necessary.

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

To

1

redemption amount.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PETTEY:

4

Thank you.

Mr. Pettey?

Your Honor, we stipulate to those

items that Mr. Rampton indicated that we would stipulate to.

5

With respect to the additional $12,905, that was

6

an expenditure made pursuant to a notice and order issued by

7

Salt Lake City Corporation directing Gloria Ruiz to demolish

8

certain structures on the property and then to comply with

9

the proper ordinances and fill and grade and level the

10
11

property.
It is our intention to show that in fact that was

12

done; that a reasonable amount was paid for those services

13

and that she should in fact be compensated for that.

14

We are ready to proceed.

15

THE COURT:

16
17
18
19
20

I think the sensible way is for you to

proceed and establish what was done and why.
MR. PETTEY:

Okay, that's fine.

We'd like to call

Gloria Ruiz to the stand.
THE COURT:

Ms. Ruiz, if you will come up here and

be sworn, please.

21

GLORIA RUIZ,

22

called as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiff, being

23

first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

24
25

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETTEY:

/"»/-\ i.*r% TT\

i

1
2 J

Q

Mrs. Ruiz, would you please state your name and

address for the court reporter.

3

A

Gloria Ruiz.

4

Q

And what is your relationship with CVF Land?

5 J

A

That is my company.

6 J

Q

Okay.

7 I

1335 East 4130 South.

You did purchase property at 145 North

Redwood Road at a Sheriff's sale?

8

A

I did.

9

Q

How much did you pay for that purpose?

10

A

$28,000.

11

Q

All right.

12
13

Subsequent to the purchase of that

property, have you paid any additional sums?
A

Yes, I have paid the taxes for $505 or $504 I

14

believe it was, and the demolition services and removing the

15

house, and trees on the property, and I have got the letter

16

from the sheriff to do.

17

Q

Okay.

18

demolished?

19

A

Well, I was told that it was a hazard to —

20
21

Why did you have those buildings

MR. RAMPTON:
objection.

22

I'm sorry, I need to interpose an

It calls for hearsay testimony from the City.

THE COURT:

Well, it can be admitted not as to the

23

truthfulness of it; to explain why she did what she did.

24

Overruled.

25

You can proceed.

THE WITNESS:

That's why I did it because with the

letter from the sheriff, I thought, well, somebody could get
hurt there and I'd be liable for it.
Q

Okay.

I show you a document and I'd like you to

tell me if you are familiar with that document and exactly
what it is?
A

It is a notice from the Sheriff's office, I guess,

for Salt Lake to do that.
Q

Have you seen that before; that document?

A

I must have.

I didn't bring my glasses and I

can't really tell what I am reading.
Q

Very embarassing.

Would you read what it says on the notice, at

least the first —

what the heading is on that document.

MR. RAMPTON:

Your Honor, I am going to object

before the document comes into evidence or its contents. It
needs to be offered.

I believe this is a document that

hasn't been authenticated.
THE COURT:

Well, sustained at this point. I

don't think you should have her read from it until it's been
admitted.
MR. PETTEY:
THE COURT:
MR. RAMPTON:

Your Honor, I'd like to submit for —
Any objection?
This appears to be a document

supposedly issued by Salt Lake City Corporation.
a certified document.

It is not

There is no certification on it.

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

There is no authenticating witnesses to state that it is
what it purports to bef so we object to its being received.
MR. PETTEY:
THE COURT:

Mrs. Ruiz,r I think you received it —
Right. It will be admitted; not

necessarily for the truthfulness of its content, but to

J

explain why she did what she did,»
MR. PETTEY:

You received it before you had the

demoliti on done?
THE COURT:

It will be received.

Better have it marked as Exhibit 1.
(Plaintifffs Exhibit No. 1 was
received in evidence.)
Q

(By Mr. Pettey)

When you received this document,

may I ask what you then did with it, or did, pursuant to
receiving the document?
A

Well, I really didn't know what to do with it, so

I called Jay and asked him about it.
Q

Would you please explain —

identify to the court

who you mean by Jay?
A

He is the realtor that works with me.

Q

What is his full name?

A

Jay Hansen.

Q

So you delivered that document to him, then?

A

Yes, because I had not expected to have to do

anything to the property until I would know if it was mine

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION
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1

or not.

I thought this was strange.

2

Q

Did you contact the City yourself?

3

A

No, I didn't.

4

Q

You did not?

5

A

No.

6

Q

You turned the document over to?

7

A

To Jay and asked him to do it for me.

8

Q

Okay.

9
10
11

Now, were you involved, from that point

forward, with regard to arranging for the demolition, or did
you have Mr. Hansen arrange for it?
A

I had Mr. Hansen arrange it for me because I

12

didn't know who to call.

13

should do with it.

14

Q

I didn't know anybody, what I

Let me ask you then, one additional question.

15

the demolition work —

16

property?>

was demolition work done on the

17

A

Yes, it was.

18

Q

And who performed that work?

19

A

Cliff Johnson I believe.

20

Was

I don't remember.

It is

the name of the person.

21

Q

Were you satisfied with the job that was done?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Did you personally inspect that yourself?

24

A

Yes.

25

I went to see it because there was some old

trees that had to be knocked down, and the house, and at the

p r r n m nmr*r>_ *

1

time I th ink there was some people living in the hoiise t:hat

2

shouldn't have been there.

3
4

Q

Okay.

Did you receive a bill, then, from Mr.

Johnson f or the services?

5

A

I did.

6

Q

And did you pay for those services?

7

A

I did.

8

Q

Would you be familiar with the billing if you saw

9

thatf or was that given to Mr. Hansen?

10

A

It came to me.

11

Q

You did pay for it with a personal check?

12

A

With a company check.

13

Q

Okay.

14

I have a copy of the check that she made

the payme nt with, your Honor.
MR. RAMPTON:

15

No objection, your Honor.

16

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 was

17

received in evidence.)

18

THE COURT:

19

You better have it marked Exhibit 2.

20

MR. PETTEY:

Is that the check then that you ]paid

Mr. Johnson with?

23

A

Yes, it is.

24

Q

Okay.

25

It will be

received.

21
22

It will be received.

Fine.

Were there other items that you had

anticipated doing to improve that property, besides the

1
2

demolition work?
A

I had thought that I would want to build onto it.

3

That was my idea of purchasing it to begin with, because I

4

wanted to build.

5

Q

You have not started construction on the premises?

6

A

No, absolutely not.

7

Q

Why have you not started construction?

8

A

I was waiting to see what was resolved.

9
10
11

mine until —
Q

You understood this property would not be yours

until the six months redemption period was over?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Okay.

14

Fine.

MR. PETTEY:

I have no further questions of Mrs.

15

Ruiz at this time, your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

17

Mr. Rampton.

18

MR. RAMPTON:

19

fty t u r n ,

20
21
22
23

It wasn't

Thank you.

J u s t a few, y o u r

Mrs. R u i z .

Honor.

Sorry.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. RAMPTON:
Q

Mrs. Ruiz, before the house on this property was

demolished, did you go inside of it?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Did you ever go down in the lower story of it?

1

A

There was a basement down there, but I never went

3

Q

Do you know how deep it was?

4

A

No, I don't.

5

Q

Do you know how big the house was?

6

A

I don't know.

2

7

down.

It was a small house.

I'd say

probably four-room house.

8

Q

What other buildings were there on the lot besides

9

the house?

10

A

Just the house and then old treesf ugly old trees.

11

Q

Speaking of the trees, you mentioned they needed

12

to be torn down.

What gave you to believe the trees had to

13

be removed?

14

A

15

dangerous.

16

these old trees have broken and it could cause damage to

17

anybody parked there, or even people passing.

Well, to level it and —
Okay.

Okay.

They said it was

Living at my house, I have seen where

18

Q

Who was it that told you the trees were dangerous?

19

A

No.

20

Q

No one told you they were a danger?

21

A

No.

22

Q

Did you —

23

testimony.

24

Jay Hansen once you received the notice that's been marked

25

as Exhibit 1?

I said that.

I just thought they'd have to be cleaned out.
I want to make sure I understand your

You say you handed this entire operation over to

r»AunriTiT?n_7kTnr'n
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

So you never obtained any bids, yourself, on this

3

demolition project?

4

A

No, I didn't.

5

Q

When you received the bill from the excavating

6

company that performed the job, did you show it to any other

7

company to find out if it was a reasonable bill?

8

A

I didn't know.

9

Q

Did you challenge him at all on it personally?

10

A

No, I didn't, because I am not aware of these

11
12

things, how much it cost to do it or not.
Q

Did you have any discussion with the excavator as

13

to what specificly needed to be done to comply with the

14

notice you received?

15

A

No, I didn't.

I thought Jay would do that.

16

Q

Did you have any discussion with anyone at all,

17

before the job was done, about changing the grade of the

18

entire lot?

19

A

I didn't.

20

Q

Mrs. Ruiz —

21

Honor,.

22
23

if I may approach the witness, your

THE COURT
Q

Yes.

Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 3,

24

which appears to be an appeal filed with Salt Lake City with

25

respect to landscaping requirements.

PAi/nnmnn

* -r I-N T-I T-V m-r

Do you recognize the

document at all?

A

I think Jay brought this for me to see.

And most

of this six months I have been kind of ill, so I have just
told him to do what he had to do.

Q

But you do recall Mr. —

that's Hansen you are

referring[ to?

A

Yes.

Q

He did show it to you?

A

Yes.

Q

What was your understanding of the purpose of the

document when you received it?

A

To go ahead and get that work done.

If that's

what we had to do, then do it.

Q

Let me show you now what's been marked as Exhibit

4, and as k you if you have ever seen that before?

A

Yes.

Q

When did you see it?

A

I don't remember, but I got this.

Q

You did receive that letter?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you think you received it about the dates

that's ori it, March 23rd of '89?

A

I must have received it around there, but I don't

remember.
MR. RAMPTON:

I'd ask that Exhibit 3 and 4 be

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION
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1

received in evidence.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PETTEY:

4

THE COURT:

Any objection?
No objection.
They will be received.

5

(Defendants* Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4.

6

Were received in evidence.)

7

MR. PETTEY:

That is all I have, your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

Any further questions, Mr, Pettey?

9

MR. PETTEY:
THE COURT:

10

No, your Honor.
You can step down.

Thank you.

(Witness excused.)

11
12

THE COURT:

13

MR. PETTEY:

14

Your Honor, I'd like to call Jay Hansen.

15

THE COURT:

16

Any more witnesses, Mr. Pettey?
Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Hansen, if you will come up here

and be sworn, please.

17

J. D. HANSEN,

18

Called as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiff, being

19

first dluly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

20
21
22
23
24
25

BY MR. PETTEY •
•

Q

Mr. Hansen, would you please state your full name

and current address, for the record.
A

M y iname

is J.D. Hansen.

My address —- my home

address is 4201 Cumbe rland Road, Salt Lake City •

1

Q

And what is your profession, you are engaged in?

2

A

I am a real estate broker.

3 J

Q

How many years have you been engaged in that

4 I

business?

5

A

39 years.

6

Q

Are you familiar with both residential and

7

commercial properties?

8

A

Yes, I am.

9 I

Q

Are you —

10

A

Yes, I do.

11

Q

What is your relationship with her?

12

A

Gloria Ruiz is a customer or client of mine. I

do you know Gloria Ruiz?

13

have been working with her for several years in her real

14

estate matters.

15
16

Q

Are you familiar with the property located at 145

North Redwood Road?

17

A

Yes, I am.

18

Q

Would you have been involved with Mrs. Ruiz in

19

that purchase —

her purchase of that property?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

She has indicated that she had you carry on

22

basically the situation with regards to the excavating and

23

demolition of the property; is that correct?

24

A

That's right.

25

Q

Mr. Hansen, are you familiar with that document

1

that I have just handed to you?

2

A

Yes, I am.

3

Q^

This exhibit?

4
5

And where did you first see that document?
A

I received a phone call from Mrs. Ruiz that she

6

had received this document and I went to her place of

7

business and she gave it to me at that time.

8
9
10

Q

What did you do, then, after you received the

document?
A

I talked to the City about it.

I went to the City

11

offices, talked to Mr. Cupit about what was to be expected

12

of us.

13

Q

Who is Mr. Cupit?

14

A

Well, I don't know his title.

15

he's —

16

attorney, but he has the responsibility with the Department

17

of Building and Housing Services of inspecting and dealing

18

with derelict properties, I guess.

19
20
21

Q

Isn't here, but

I think he is the legal officer or legal —

All right.

not an

And did you talk to him about Mrs.

Ruiz's interest in that property?
A

Well, I indicated to him that she had purchased

22

the property on the Sheriff's sale, and that she had

23

intentions to develop the property, but that we, at this

24

point, wanted —

25

requirements as far as this notice and order were concerned.

her intent would be to comply with the City

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION
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1

Q

Okay.

And what did he tell you with respect to

2

how soon that notice and order would need to be complied

3

with ?

4

MR. RAMPTON:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. PETTEY:

7

Q

Objection.

Hearsay, your Honor.

I think that would be hearsay.
I will rephrase that, your Honor.

Could you tell us a little bit about your

8

discussion wi1^h him, what perhaps your understanding of what

9

that notice requiredf and what he told you it required?

10

A

MR. RAMPTON:

11
12

—

Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Pettey) Would you tell us what your

15

unde rstanding is of that notice?

16

MR. RAMPTON:

17

THE COURT:

19

MR. PETTEY:

21
22

Objection.

The notice speaks for

itself if it .Is in evidence.

18

20

Still

hear say.

13
14

Well, Mr. Cupit said

Q

Sustained.
Okay.

After you received that notice from Mrs. Ruiz, and

had talked wilth the City, what did you then do.
A

Well, I —

after meeting with the City, with Mr.

23

Cupi t, they were —

had expressed the intent that that — or

24

how do I want to stay it?

25

for them for some time, and they were anxious to see that it

The property had been a problem

1

was taken down.

They had some law enforcement problems.

2

They said the property was being occupied by vagrants,

3

transients, and so they were —

4 I

standing problem.

apparently had been a long

5

THE COURT:

6

He just asked you what you did.

7

say what you did.

8
9
10

Sustained.
He wants you to

Not what he told you.

THE WITNESS:

After meeting with Mr. Cupit and

getting his point of view on the property, they're attitude.
I contacted some contractors about the demolition.

11

Q

(By Mr.

12

A

Three.

13

Q

And what did you solicit from those contractors?

14

A

I wanted a bid for demolition, cleaning up the

15

Pettey)

How many contractors?

lot, and bringing it up to grade.

16

Q

Explain what you mean by bringing it up to grade?

17

A

Well, there is in the City, with demolition —

if

18

you get a right to demolish a property, you have to meet the

19 I

City standards on grading.

20

MR. RAMPTON:

Objection, your Honor.

The witness

21

is testifying as if he is an expert on demolition and City

22

requirements.

23
24
25

He has not qualified himself as that.

THE COURT:
answer.

I think he can testify if he knows the

Overruled.
THE WITNESS:

The demolition or that is —

there

is a land scaping requirement which requires that the lot
have lawn and sprinklers.

They have —

when you demolish a

property, unless it is going to be put in immediate use, you
have to p rovide a landscaping plan.

And I had submitted a

document which asked for exceptions to that landscaping
plan r bas ed on the fact that the intent was to develop the
property in a fairly early time, and that landscaping would
be an imp ractical situation at this time.

That's when we

were told we had to fill the property, we had to grade it.
MR. RAMPTON:

Objection.

Strike the last comment

as hearsay.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained. It will be stricken.

(By Mr. Pettey) When you contacted these three

different contractors, did you obtain bids from them?
A

Yes, I did.

I obtained bids from three

contractors.
Q

And did you review those bids with Mrs. Ruiz?

A

I believe I did.

I believe I discussed that with

her, what I was getting in the way of bids.

I am sure I

did.
Q

Which bid did you accept, then?

A

I accepted the bid from Cliff Johnson.

It was the

lowest fi<gure.
Q

His was in fact the lowest bid?

A

Absolutely.
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1
2

Q

Did you give Mr. Johnson any specific instructions

with respect to what type of fill material he was to use?

3

A

The City had specified in their order that there

4

was a requirement that the fill had to be clean, and the

5

aggregate not to exceed, that is the size of the aggregate

6

not to exceed two inches, and that's the instruction I gave

7

him.

8

Q

Those are the instructions that you gave to him?

9

A

That's right.

10

Q

And did you have any reason to doubt that the bid

11

that he gave you was an unreasonable bid?

12

A

No. No, I didn't.

13

Q

And did Mr. Johnson complete that work?

14

A

He did. Very quickly and very efficiently.

15

prompt, and it was well done.

16
17

MR. PETTEY:

THE COURT:

19

21
22

Okay.

I have no further questions,

your Honor.

18

20

Very

Mr. Rampton?
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. RAMPTON:

Q

Mr. Hansen, when you received a bill from Johnson

Excavating, did you question the amount of it?

23

A

I knew what the bid was before he started.

24

Q

And it corresponded with the bid?

25

A

That's right.

COMPTTTF.R-ATnF.n
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MR. RAMPTON:

1
2
3

May I see Exhibit 4, your Honor?

Mr. Hansen, let me show you what's been received

Q

into evidence as Exhibit 4.

Do you recognize that letter?

4

A

Yes, I do.

5

Q

Does this letter refer to what you refer to in

6
7

your te stimony as the landscaping requirement?
A

Well, no.

This is not the landscaping

8

requirement.

We had made an application for a variance of

9

the Ian dscaping requirement.

There are some other documents

10

that — maybe they are easier to deal with on that

11

situation.

12

Q

But I don't mean to go on here.
(By Mr. Rampton)

My question was whether this

13

letter referred to the landscaping requirement you were

14

talking about or not?

15
16
17
18
19
20

A

This is the —

this letter grants the exceptions

to the landscaping requirement and tells us what we must do.
Q

So this letter then was an exception from the

landscaping requirement that you have testified to?
A

Yeah.

Which is sodding and all that business, and

sprinkl ing system.

21

MR. RAMPTON:

I have nothing further.

22

THE COURT:

Anything further of this witness?

23

MR. PETTY:

No.

24

THE COURT:

Anymore witnesses, Mr. Rampton?

25

MR. RAMPTON:

He may step down.

1

Thank you, your Honor.

2

(Witness excused.)

3

Call Mr. Rowland H. Merrill, please.

4

THE COURT:

Mr. Merrill.

5

ROWLAND H. MERRILL,

6

Called as a witness at the instance of the Defendant, being

7

first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

8
9

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RAMPTON:

10

Q

State your name for the record, please, sir.

11

A

Pardon?

12

Q

State your name for the record.

13

A

Rowland H. Merrill.

14

Q

Current address?

15

A

1821 South Main Street, Salt Lake City.

16

Q

Mr. Merrill, were you the owner of a home at 145

17

North Redwood Road in Salt Lake City?

18

A

Yes, I was.

19

Q

When was that?

20

A

I bought it in approximately 1978.

I can't —

21

was the spring of the year, either '78 or '79, on a

22

contract.

23
24
25

Q

And you owned it until the Sheriff's sale in

February; is that correct?
A

Yes, I did.

rOMPTTTPR-ZvTnPn
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Q

Did you ever occupy it?

A

No.

Q

Did you ever go inside?

A

Yes.

Q

Are you familiar with the size of the home?

A

Yes.

Q

How big was it?

A

I'd guess it is between 700 and 750 square feet.

Q

Is there any way it could have been more than 800

square feet?
A

I doubt it.

If they did that, I think they'd have

to count some things that I didn't count as part of the
house, such as the front porch.

I don't even think they'd

get over 800.
Q

Was there a full basement in the home?

A

No.

Q

What was underneath the main floor?

A

To my knowledge, there was a crawl space and they

may have dug a space out underneath the home for some sort
of storage underneath.
Q

How deep would that have been?

A

Under six feet, five, six feet.

Q

Mr. Merrill, I want to show you three photographs

and ask you if you recognize the home that's depicted in
those photographs?

Do you recognize what is on those

rOMPTTTF.R-ATnF.n

TR AMQPRTPTTOM

21

1 J

pictures?

2

A

Yes.

I believe it is the house we are talking

3

about.

4

things, because there are several houses around there that

5

are the same.

I am trying to look at some other identifying

6

Q

7

Thank you.

I didn't realize this was painted that color.

L e t m e r e c e i v e those back f o r n o w , if I may.

8

The land around the house, during the time that

9

you owned it, was it on a level with the adjacent Redwood

10

Road, or was it lower?

11 I

A

It w a s a l i t t l e b i t lower than R e d w o o d R o a d .

12

Q

Was the land around the house itself level?

13

A

Somewhat level.

14

in the back.

15
16
17

Q

But it was pretty close to level.

Was it fairly flat in the immediate vicinity of

the house, is what I am asking?
A

18
19

Yes.
MR. RAMPTON:

THE COURT:

21

MR. PETTEY:

22

24
25

I have no further questions, your

Honor.

20

23

I think it sloped up a little bit

Mr. Pettey, any questions?
Just one.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

B Y MR. P E T T E Y :
Q

Would you clarify, when you say it is sloped, do

you mean it sloped up or down?

1

A

It is sloped —

Redwood Road is something like

2

this, then it goes off like that.

The property is down here

3

and it is sloped upward toward the back.

4 1

Q

It is sloped up toward the back?

5

A

Toward the road?

6 I

Q

The majority of it was below the Redwood Road?

7 I

A

Below the asphalt level, yes.

8

MR. RAMPTON:

9

THE COURT:

Anymore questions?

10

MR. RAMPTON:

11

THE COURT:

(Witness excused.)

13

MR. RAMPTON:

Call Craig R. Merrill to the stand,

please.

15 I
16

Nothing further, your Honor.

You can step down.

12

14

Nothing further.

THE COURT:

Mr. Merrill, if you would come up here

and be sworn, please.

17

CRAIG C. MERRILL,

18

Called as a witness at the instance of the Defendants,

19

being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as

20

follows:

21
22

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RAMPTON:

23

Q

State your name for the record, please, sir.

24

A

Craig C. Merrill.

25

Q

And your current address?

rOMPnTF.R-ATDFn
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1

A

1082 East Birchbrook Circle in Midvale.

2

Q

Let me show you photographs which have been marked

3

for identification as Exhibit 5, 6 and 7 and ask you if you

4

recognize those photographs?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Did you take them?

7

A

My daughter took them.

8

Q

Were you present when she took them?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Do you recognize the house that is depicted in the

11

photographs?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Where is it?

14

A

The house is located at immediately north of the

15

property that we have been talking about.

16

North Redwood Road.

17
18

Q

I think it is 171

Did you personally see the home located at 145

North Redwood Road before it was demolished?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Is there any similarity between the home that was

21 J

demolished and the home we are looking at in this picture?

22

A

23

twins.

24

Q

25

To my recollection, those homes were essentially

I'd ask that Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 be received in

evidence, your Honor.

PAmrnnrm

THE COURT:

Any objection?

MR. PETTEY :
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
They will be received.

(Defendants1 Exhibit Nos. 5f 6 and 7.
Were received in evidence.)
THE COURT:

That's all I have of this witness.

THE COURT:

Any questions, Mr. Pettey?

MR. PETTEY :
THE COURT:

Yes.

Just one, your Honor.

He has a question for you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. PETTEY:»
Q

This particular property which you indicate is

just north of the su bject property at 145 North?
A

Yes •

Q

Is that lot on the same or was that lot on the

same level as the pr operty that was —

the home that was

demolished, or is it lower or higher?
A

It is lower than Redwood Road.

little bit into the property.

You do go down a

It is also lower than

Street,, which is the street that separates them.

Ge r t i e

I couldn't

say for sure, but I think it is lower than the Galloway
property was, or about the same, or perhaps slightly

higher.

My feeling is it is reasonably close.
MR. PETTEY :
THE COURT:

Okay.

No further questions.

Any questions?
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1

MR. RAMPTON:

2

THE COURT: You can step down.

3

MR. RAMPTON:

Call John Henry McCaughey to the

standf please.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. RAMPTON:

8

Thank you.

(Witness excused.)

4
5

No, your Honor.

Mr. —

say it again.

McCaughey.

If you will come up here

and be sworn, please.

9

JOHN HENRY McCAUGHEY,

10

Called as a witness at the instance of the Defendants,

11

being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as

12

follows:

13
14
15
16

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RAMPTON:
Q

If you would state your name and spell your last

name for the reporter.

17

A

John Henry McCaghey M.C.C.A.U.G.H.E.Y.

18

Q

What is your current address, sir?

19

A

588 East Vine, Number 2-B, Murray, Utah.

20

Q

And your current occupation?

21 J

A

I am a demolition contractor.

22

Q

What company are you with?

23

A

Northern Nevada Construction.

24

Q

What is your position with the company?

25

A

I am the General Manager and Vice-president.

1

Q

Briefly, describe your duties.

2

A

Bid all of our work.

I am the dispatcher, run the

3

shop, ha ndle all the maintenance.

4

mean, I sign all the checks, hire, fire, profit and loss is

5

my responsibility.

I am general manager.

6

Q

Do you still do onsite work as well?

7

A

Yes.

8

When necessary.

I

When I don't have enough

people t o do go around, I do the work myself.

9

Q

How long have you been a demolition excavator?

10

A

About seven years.

11

Q

How many projects would you say you have handled

12

in that time?

13

A

1,500.

14

Q

Have you any recent projects you have done which

15
16

you can identify for the Court?

A

We are just finishing doing the Centre Theater.

17

We j us t finished digging the hole.

18

building there.

19

Securiti es Finance 15 holes we are finished tearing out.

20

just tore down part of Hillcrest Junior High School for

21

remodeli ng.

22

Q

We tore down that

We are doing the Gordon Place for Zions

Thank you.

We

I want to ask you a hypothetical

23

question based on your experience in the demolition expert

24

estimation business. I want you to assume a private

25

residence of not more than 800 square feet composed of clap

nrwm
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1

board, one story structure with a crawl space of not more

2

than six feet deep underneath, which you are required to

3

demolish and fill the remaining hole.

4

opinion as to what you would bid that project at?

5
6
7
8

A

Well, I just did two, two weeks ago that fit that

description exactly.
Q

Do you have an

I did them each for $1,500.

Does that include the hauling, supplying of fill

material?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

I want you, if you will, to look at the paragraphs

11

that are in front of you, which have been received as

12

Exhibits 5, 6 and 7.

13

ask you another question.

14

North on Redwood Road?

Before you talk about those, let me
Have you visited the site at 145

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Do you recognize the house that is depicted in the

17
18
19

three photographs before you?
A

Well, it looks a lot like the house just to the

north of that address.

20

Q

You saw that house while you were there?

21

A

Yes.

22
23

alleyway there.
Q

It is just on the side there is a little
I took a peek over there.

Is the bid that you just described, the $1,500

24

bid, could that hold true for demolishing this house which

25

you are looking at?
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1

A

Well, I could do it for that.

It would help if I

2

knew who I was bidding against, then I'd know how high I

3 J

could go,

I could do this job for 1,500 easy.

4

Q

What do you base 1,500 on?

5 I

A

Well, it is kind of a —

on bigger projects, we

6 I

bid our job by the cubic yard.

We determine how many cubic

7 I

yards of debris is in the project.

8

the cubic yard.

9 I

work because there is so few cubic yards of house, in the

We have a unit price for

And for that house, that equasion wouldn't

10

trash, that it wouldn't cover our mobilization cost.

11

basically do houses on —

12

ranging from a thousand dollars to $2,500 depending on the

13

size of the house, and the location of the house, and

14

whether it has got a full basement underneath it or whether

15

or not we are going to be required by the owner the fill the

16

basement, or —

17
18

Q

So we

we have fixed costs for houses

you see what I am saying.

Yes.

So it would be bid on a piece basis rather

than a yardage basis?

19

A

Right.

20

Q

How about the fill, your $1,500 assumption, what

21
22

kind of fill work?
A

Well, the City requires that if you are going to

23

change the grade, any grade change of the project over two

24

feet, you have to make up that two feet.

25

like this —

Which, of a house

I mean, I checked this house out the other day

when I was over there looking at 145.

It has got a crawl

space underneath it, so we would plan on filing the crawl
space up right to whatever the grade around the house was,
because that's what the City would require.

A house like

this would take maybe 60, 70 yards of fill.

Wefd roll it in

with a Cat and that would be that.
Q

You testified a moment ago about City

requirements.

What is your understanding, as a cost

estimator, of City requirements where a house is demolished,
what do you have to do as far as fill and grading at that —
after that point?
A

Well, like I said, what they are predominantly

looking for, they don't want any steep dropoffs or any
hazardous situation being the result of a demolition job, so
they have got that two-foot requirement. The two foot cut
off, if you can slope it off the crawl space and it doesn't
result in more than a two-foot grade variation, then you
don't have to fill it at all.

But if you are going to

produce a grade variation where the house was, or if you are
going to produce a grade variation anywhere, you have to
make up that difference with fill.
Q

Is there any requirement in the City that after a

house is demolished, the entire lot must be changed in grade
to that of surrounding sites?
A

No.
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So if a house sits lower than a surrounding site,

Q

you don't have to fill that in as part of the demolition
project?
A

No.

Q

Is tree removal a requirement of the City in

conjunction with a demolition project?
A

Well, quite the opposite.

The whole landscape

ordinance that went into effect in 1986 was an attempt to
keep land scaping and trees growing in the City.

So that's

why the C ity is requiring people to post landscape plans
prior to getting demolition permits.
Now, a lot of people get around that with weed
waivers, you know, by saying well, we will keep the weeds
cut down, because they can convince the City that they are
going to have a future project.

But even the weed waivers

these day s are hard to come by.

And in most cases, if you

don't have a landscape bond, you have to have your new plans
approved for a new project before they will even let you
tear a pi ace down.
In the case of this, where there was an order out
to get it demolished, they are a lot more lenient with their
weed waivers, because if it goes too far the City is going
to condemn the property.

And City projects are exempt from

the landscape ordinance, and so they have —
could

you know, they

— I think they could see one step beyond this one,

PnMDTTTITD-BTnrn
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1

just gave him the weed waiver and let him knock it down.

2
3

MR. RAMPTON:
this witness.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. PETTEY:

6
7
8
9

I don't have anymore questions of

Any questions, Mr. Pettey?
Yes, your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. PETTEY:
Q

Mr. McCaughey, did you ever inspect or see this

property prior to the time that the demolition occurred?

10

A

Oh, I have seen it but I didn't inspect it.

11

Q

Had you seen it when it did have buildings on it?

12

A

Uh-huh.

13

Q

Okay.

14
15

Were you aware of how many structures were

on the property?
A

Well, to the best of my knowledge, there was a

16

house up front and had a little garage, had a little shed, I

17

think.

There was a little root cellar or something out

18

there.

I bid on that Casablanca Motel which was right

19

around that Norwood Club from where that house was.

20

was a house right behind that one that had to come out with

21

that project, so I was kind of traipsing all over that place

22

about a year ago.

23
24
25

Q

You have been on the property since the demolition

has occurred, and the grading?
A

There

Yes.

1

Q

So you are familiar with the fill that is there

3

A

Uh-huh.

4 1

Q

If you had done the demolition work and brought in

2

now?
(Affirmative)

5 J

the fill, the same type of fill, same quality, et cetera,

6

and done that job comparable to what was done, do you have

7

an estimate as to what you would have charged for that type

8

of service?

9

MR, RAMPTON:

I am going to object to the

10

question.

There is no evidence this man knows exactly what

11 I

was done.

He said he hasn't been on the site since the

12

project was completed.

13

THE COURT:

14

probably has an idea.

15

can.

Well, I think if he was out there he
If you can answer the question, you

If it is not possible, then, just say so.

16

THE WITNESS:

Yeah, it is kind of hard to bid on a

17

job that has already happened.

18

time that this job occurred, I could tell you what I would

19

have bid.

20

I was bidding on houses at the time.
THE COURT:

22

including removing the trees?

24
25

at the

I would have bid 1,800 bucks because that's what

21

23

But, at the time —

To do everything that was done,

THE WITNESS:

No, not including removal of the

trees.
THE COURT:

Including everything that was done, is

1

what he wants to know.

2

same thing?

3

THE WITNESS:

4
5

Q

What would have you charged for the

$2 f 500.

(By Mr. Pettey)

Including bringing in the amount

of fill?

6

A

What amount?

7

Q

Well, I guess I am asking the amount of fill that

8

was brought in, your not familiar with that?

9
10

A

Well, I would have just filled the crawl space

under the house.

11

THE COURT:

He wants to know what you would have

12

charged, what was actually done.

13

THE WITNESS:

14

THE COURT:

15

THE WITNESS:

16

MR. PETTEY:

17

that.

THE COURT:

19

MR. RAMPTON:

20

22

If you don't know, I guess

—

I don't know.
I thought perhaps he was aware of

No further questions.

18

21

What was done?

Anything further, Mr. Rampton?
Just a couple of questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RAMPTON:
Q

You testified, regarding cross-examination, in th

23

past you observed a couple of additional buildings on the

24

property that was occupied by this house, that was torn

25

down; is that correct?
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1
2
3

A

Yeah.

I think it had its own garage.

sure it had a little garage on back.
Q

I want you now to assume your estimate has to

4

include taking down those out buildings as well.

5

that alter it?

6

I am pretty

A

How would

Well, that's why I said $1,800 because I figured

7 I

the garage and that little shed was worth about two loads,

8 I

and I figure $100 a load over my base price.

9 I
10
11 J

Q

So wouldn't change?

A

No, not appreciably.

The only thing that really

changed it was his comment about the trees.

12

Q

How many tons of fill material in a cubic yard?

13

A

Per K.Y.?

14

Q

Uh-huh.

15

A

About a ton and a half per K.Y.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. PETTEY:

18

THE COURT:

19

Anything further, Mr. Pettey?
No, your Honor.
Thank you.

(Witness excused.)

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. RAMPTON:

22

Mr. Jay Hansen for just a moment.

23
24
25

You can step down.

THE COURT:
here for a moment.

Any more witnesses, Mr. Rampton?
No, your Honor.

I'd like to recall

Mr. Hansen if you will come back up

You understand you are still under oath?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

1

THE COURT:

Thank you.

2

J. D. HANSEN,

3

Recalled as a witness at the instance of the Defendant,

4

being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as

5

follows:

6
7
8
9

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RAMPTON:
Q

Mr. Hansen, I want to show you what's been marked

as Exhibit 8 and ask you if you recognize it?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

What is it?

12

A

It is a two-page document.

It is an invoice from

13

Cliff Johnson Excavating for the fill dirt that was brought

14

into the property at 145 North Redwood Road.

15
16

MR. RAMPTON:
evidence.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. PETTEY:

19

MR. RAMPTON:

20

23

Any objection?
No, your Honor.
That's all I have, your Honor.

No

further questions.

21
22

I'd ask Exhibit 8 be received in

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Any further testimony, Mr,

Pettey.
MR. PETTEY:

24

additional question.

25

THE COURT:

Yes I'd like to ask Mr. Hansen one

Certainly.

1
2

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETTEY:

3 I

Q

Now, when you spoke with Mr. Cliff Johnson, what

4

instructions did you give to him with respect to the amount

5

of fill or the proper grade or whatever that was done to

6

that property?

7
8

A

Well, he was to bring the property up to grade

with the adjoining properties.

9

Q

Why did you tell him that?

10

A

Because the property —

the subject property was a

11

foot and a half or so —

12

but I would say at least a foot and a half below the

13

adjoining property to the rear, to the south side and below

14

both streets.

15

was part of the problem of getting the property acceptable.

16
17

Q

A

It

Did you tell him that because you personally

No.

It was my understanding the City expected the

property to be cleared off and graded.

20
21

And the property was a trash collector.

wanted it brought up to that level?

18
19

I don't know the exact dimensions,

MR. RAMPTON:

Objection to the answer.

It

incorporates hearsay testimony from the City.

22

THE COURT:

Again, it can be received as a reason

23

for doing what he did, not necessarily the truthfulness of

24

it.

25

Overruled.
MR. PETTEY:

That's all.
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1

THE COURT::

2

MR. RAMPTON:

3

THE COURT:

4

Any more questions, Mr. Rampton?
Nothing further, your Honor.
You can step down.

(Witness excused.)

5

THE COURT:

6

Well, it appears that the big majority of this

Can I see that last exhibit?

7

$12,900 expenditure is for the fill dirt to have the

8

property brought up to grade, and nearly $9,700 for the dirt

9

alone.

If you add t:hat to the amount that Mr. McCaughey

10

says is the reasonable amount for the excavation, comes out

11

about right.

12

adding that fill is a necessary maintenance upkeep or repair

13

of the property.

So the question, I guess, is whether or not,

14
15
16

MR. RAMPTON:

May I be heard on that?

There is

City law on point.

17

THE COURT :

18

MR. RAMPTON:

Sure.
Furnishing the Court a copy of City

19

Ordinance Number 18 .64.050, which reads in pertinent part as

20

follows:

21

M

A permit for demolition requires that all.

22

Material comprising part of the existing.

23

Instructions, including the foundation and.

24

Footings must 1oe removed from the site.

25

The depression caused by the removal of such.
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1

Debris must be filled back and compacted to.

2

The original grade as approved by the building.

3

Official, with fill material" of fill dirt existing.

4

"excluding detrimental amounts of organic material.

5

Or large dimension non organic material."

6

There was no requirement of filling a entire lot

7 J

with dirt in order to bring it up to the grade of

8 I

surrounding property or the surrounding roads. You simply

9 I

have to fill the hole in.

10
11

That's the requirement based on

statute.
THE COURT:

Well, you know what you have got,

12

though, is a situation where the lady buys the property at a

13

Sheriff's sale, and it is true it is probably not too

14

prudent to spend any money on it until the redemption period

15

is passed.

16

tells her she has to demolish, whether she really reads the

17

ordinance correctly or whether she doesn't, she puts the

18

money into the property.

19

redeem it, and property has been improved, and they receive

20

the benefits of the property, improvement or upkeep.

21

not considerably a benefit.

22

house and trees and whatever, but nevertheless, what has

23

gone into it.

24
25

You know, what to do with it.

I really can't —

But the City

And then the people come in and

Maybe

They might have wanted the

you can't say that's even reasonable.

That seem to me to be the question, not whether it is, you

1 I

knowr perfectly the right thing to do, but whether it was

2

reasonable.

3

am going to rule that the redemption value here is the

4

amount paid for the property plus six percent plus the taxes

5

plus the 12,905 she paid for the excavation and 10 percent

6

interest thereon.

7

required for the amount of redemption.

8
9

And I think it was reasonable, and so I think I

And that should be the amount that's

Ask you to prepare an order to that effect, Mr.
Pettey.

10

MR. PETTEY:

11

THE COURT:

Will do, your Honor,
Court will be in recess for about two

12

or three minutes, then we will begin your matter, Mr.

13

Gaither.

14 I

(Proceedings concluded.)

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

m

MP TTTITD-A T n r n

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.
SALT LAKE COUNTY )

If NORA S. WORTHEN, an official court reporter for
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that I reported
stenographically the proceedings in the matter of GUNDA M.
GALLOWAY VS. ROWLAND H. MERRILL, JR., Case No. 880901017,
and that the above and foregoing is a true and correct
transcript of said proceedings.

Dated this 13th day of November, 1989.

Notary Public
NORAS.WORTHEN
240 East 400 So. #A-513
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
My Commission Expires

December 27,1992
State of Utah

!
I
I
!
I

I

B

Nora S. W o r t h e n , CSR, RPR, CP
Utah L i c e n s e No. 205

COMPUTER-ATDF.n

TRAM^RTDTTHM

A1

Attachment
9

Jax H. Pettey
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Civil No.

Judge

C88-1017

Scott

Daniels

Defendants.

The Petition

for Determination

of Redemption Amount

under

Rule 69(f)3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by Marcia S.
Merrill

came on for hearing on the 13th day of October, 1989,

before the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge of the above-entit1ed
Court,

Petitioner was present and represented by her counsel,

Vincent C. Rampton of Watkiss and Campbell.
Ruiz dba CVF Land

Respondent

Investment Company was present and

Gloria

represented

by

her

items

c o u n s e l , Jax
in open

evidence

court

presented

advised

H. P e t t e y .
and

to the C o u r t .

of

1.

Gloria
all

property

The

located

legal

IT

Ruiz

right,

Lake C o u n t y ,

and

parties
testimony

The Court

having

made

stipulated
was

to

given

having

and

been

its Findings

several

fully

of Fact

and

Law,

NOW T H E R E F O R E ,

awarded

thereafter

in the premises

C o n e I us i ons

The

at

Utah,

IS H E R E B Y

dba C V F

title

Land

and

description

of

Investment

interest

145 North
subject

ORDERED:

Redwood

only

said

in and

Company

is

to

certain

that

Road, Salt

to s t a t u t o r y

property

hereby

Lake C i t y ,

redemption

real
Salt

rights.

is:

The South 88 feet of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20 and
21, and 2 2 , Block 2, C H A R L E S S. D E S K Y ! S F O U R T H
A D D I T I O N , a c c o r d i n g to the official plats
t h e r e o f , recorded in the office of the C o u n t y
R e c o r d e r of Salt L a k e C o u n t y , U t a h .
C o m m e n c i n g at the S o u t h e a s t corner of Lot 2 2 ,
Block 2, C H A R L E S S. D E S K Y ' S FOURTH A D D I T I O N ;
thence West 136 feet;
thence S o u t h 56 feet
thence Wes t 14 feet;
thence North 23 feet
thence East 150 feet to
thence North 33 feet
the point of B E G I N N I N G .
2.
pursuant

The

to Rule

determined
following

total

by

amount

necessary

for

6 9 ( f ) ( 3 ) , Utah Rules

the C o u r t

redemption

of Civil

to be $ 4 5 , 1 8 6 . 2 2 , w h i c h

of

the

Procedure

property
is

is the sum of

the

i terns:
a.

Purchase

Price

b.

19 88 T a x e s

c.

Demolition,

d.

Surcharge

e.

Interest

Paid

28,000.00.

Paid

of
at

500.20

Fill <3cGrading
6%
the

of

purchase

rate

of

TOTAL

paid

...12,905.00

price

1 0 % per

annum

1,680.00
2,101.02
45,186.2 2

DATED this

day of September, 1989.
BY THE COURT

Judge Scot t Dan i els
D i s t i c t Cour t Judge

